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Case Notes
TORTS-JOINT ENTERPRISE DOCTRINE-A Flying School/Air-
craft Owner Is Engaged in a Joint Enterprise with its Student Pilots
and Is Vicariously Liable for the Student's Negligent Acts. Alle-
gheny Airlines, Inc. v. United States, 504 F.2d 104 (7th Cir.
1974), cert. denied, 43 U.S.L.W. 3614 (1975).
On September 9, 1969, Robert W. Carey, a student pilot flying
a solo cross-country flight in a plane owned by the operator of the
flight school in which he was enrolled, collided with an Allegheny
Airlines plane near Fairland, Indiana, destroying both aircraft and
killing Carey, the crew of the Allegheny aircraft, and all 78 passen-
gers.' Allegheny Airlines, Inc. and G.E.C.C. Leasing Corporation
brought suit seeking recovery of damages sustained by their aircraft
and engine, and named Forth Corporation, owner of the airplane
and operator of the flying school, as a defendant. The trial court,
in holding for the defendants, determined that Allegheny Airlines
was contributorily negligent in the operation of its aircraft and
that neither joint enterprise nor statutory vicarious liability were
applicable. The defendants appealed the trial court's decision to
the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals. Held, reversed: A flying
school/aircraft owner is engaged in a joint enterprise with its stu-
dent pilots and is vicariously liable for the student's negligent acts.
Imputed negligence has been with the law for many years. Wheth-
er called vicarious liability or imputed contributory negligence, the
terms used to characterize the parties' relationship, agency, joint
enterprise (a type of agency),' master/servant relations,' and "ultra-
'1970 NTSB REP. AAR-70-15.
2 Prosser defines joint enterprise in the following way:
A "joint enterprise" is something like a partnership, for a more
limited period of time, and a more limited purpose. It is an under-
taking to carry out a small number of acts or objectives, which is
entered into by associates under such circumstances that all have
an equal voice in directing the conduct of the enterprise. The law
then considers that each is the agent or servant of the others, and
that the act of any one within the scope of the enterprise is to be
charged vicariously against the rest. Whether such a relation exists
between the parties is normally a question for the jury, under
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hazardous" activity, are familiar legal "fictions" which have allowed
the shifting or spreading of liability for the negligent activity from
the actual tortfeasor to another party. Courts, supported by public
policy arguments, developed these legal fictions to enable recovery
by injured parties against the financially responsible principal,
rather than effectively denying recovery by forcing personal judg-
ments against the agent.4
The logical extension of vicarious liability into aviation has
been premised upon the same "deep pockets" reasoning found in
the development of vicarious liability in other tort areas. Just as
the automobile owner is likely to be more able than the driver to
bear the financial responsibility for the negligence of the driver on
the owner's business, so the aircraft owner would seem more capa-
ble of paying a judgment than the pilot of the plane.' As exempli-
fied by the amount of the claim in Allegheny,' damages sought for
air crash-related, tortious acts usually exceed the resources of the
estate of a negligent pilot.
Adopting this reasoning from past non-aviation tort cases,
courts have developed the principle that the vicarious liability of an
proper instructions from the court.
W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 72 (4th ed. 1971) [hereinafter
cited as PROSSER].
See generally PROSSER 55 69-74.
4 Id.
5 Current public policy considerations for vicarious liability are reflected by
Prosser:
What has emerged as the modern justification for vicarious liability
is a rule of policy, a deliberate allocation of a risk. The losses
caused by the torts of the employees, which as a practical matter
are sure to occur in the conduct of the employer's enterprise, are
placed upon that enterprise itself, as a required cost of doing busi-
ness. They are placed upon the employer because, having engaged
in an enterprise which will, on the bais of all past experience, in-
volve harm to others through the torts of employees, and sought
to profit by it, it is just that he, rather than the innocent injured
plaintiff, should bear them; and because he is better able to absorb
them, and to distribute them, through prices, rates or liability in-
surance, to the public, and so shift them to society, to the com-
munity at large.
PROSSER at 459.
6504 F.2d 104, 106-07 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 43 U.S.L.W. 3614
(May 19, 1975). Allegheny Airlines claimed against Forth Corporation for the
value of its aircraft, $3,750,000. G.E.C.C. Leasing Corporation's claim was for
$250,000, the value of one turbojet engine leased to Allegheny which was de-
stroyed in the crash.
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aircraft owner for the actions of the pilot of that aircraft is depend-
ent upon the existence of either a master/servant, bailor/bailee,
or principal/agent relationship between the owner and pilot.! Un-
fortunately, the judicial characterization of a flying school/student
pilot situation into either master/servant, bailor/bailee, or princi-
pal/agent categories, although financially expedient, would require
judicial fact-invention. Usually, a student pilot is neither bailee,
agent, nor servant to the flying school; he is more often a customer,
purchasing the services of an instructor. Reflecting dissatisfaction
with the employment of either legal fictions or judicial fact-inven-
tion to find the requisite elements of such fictions, many courts have
denounced these methods of imputing negligence to an aircraft
owner.'
Because of the dissatisfaction with the inherent incongruities ne-
cessarily a part of the legal "fictions," Congress and the state legis-
latures formulated statutory vicarious liability provisions with vary-
ing degrees of success. The Federal Aviation Act of 1958 (the Act)
provides that:
"Operation of aircraft" or "Operate aircraft" means the use of air-
craft, for the purpose of air navigation and includes the navigation
of aircraft. Any person who causes or authorizes the operation of
aircraft, whether with or without the right of legal control (in the
7 D'Aquilla v. Pryor, 122 F. Supp. 346 (S.D.N.Y. 1954). For similar holdings
in non-aviation cases see Hays v. Morgan, 221 F.2d 481 (5th Cir. 1955); Pierce
v. Horvath, 143 Ind. App. 278, 233 N.E.2d 811 (1968).
8 Broyles v. Jess, 201 Cal. App. 2d 841, 20 Cal. Rptr. 355 (1962); Boyd v.
White, 128 Cal. App. 2d 641, 276 P.2d 92 (1954); Johnson v. Central Aviation
Corp., 103 Cal. App. 2d 102, 229 P.2d 114 (1951); Ross v. Apple, 143 Ind.
App. 357, 240 N.E.2d 825 (1968), reh. den., 241 N.E.2d 872 (1968); Haskin
v. Northeast Airways, Inc., 266 Minn. 210, 123 N.W.2d 81 (1963). Where not
even the greatest stretch of the judicial imagination could cover the distance be-
tween reality and a fictional agency, the use of an airplane has occasionally, like
the use of an automobile, been considered "ultrahazardous" and the owner has
been held liable for the damage caused by its improper use, whether he was
present or not. It would seem highly improbable that flying, any more than auto-
mobile operation, should continue to bear the label of "ultrahazardous." Surpris-
ingly, some courts continue to resort to the theory that an airplane is a dangerous
instrumentality, and this theory persists in the American Law Institute's Restate-
ment of the Law of Torts. Florida regards the airplane as ultrahazardous. Orefice
v. Albert, 237 So. 2d 142 (Fla. 1970). The use of such an anachronistic device
is, however, dying and the great majority of courts have expressly refused to con-
sider the airplane ultrahazardous any longer. D'Aquilla v. Pryor, 122 F. Supp.
346 (S.D.N.Y. 1954); Boyd v. White, 128 Cal. App. 2d 641, 276 P.2d 92 (1954);
Johnson v. Central Aviation Corp., 103 Cal. App. 2d 102, 229 P.2d 114 (1951);
Wood v. United Air Lines, Inc., 32 Misc. 2d 955, 223 N.Y.S.2d 692 (1962).
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capacity of owner, lessee, or otherwise) of the aircraft, shall be
deemed to be engaged in the operation of aircraft within the mean-
ing of this chapter.!
This language or very similar language has been adopted by eigh-
teen states in their own statutes," in an attempt to resolve the prob-
lems concomitant with common law vicarious liability. Federal and
state courts have, however, had difficulty deciding whether these
statutes create or imply a civil remedy against the aircraft owner
for third parties injured through the negligence of a pilot who does
not own the aircraft he flies."
After enactment of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958, but before
the incorporation by states of similar statutory language, many liti-
gants sought a federal forum for their actions. In one such case,
Moungey v. Brandt," the District Court of the Western District of
Wisconsin refused to grant a federal remedy without finding com-
pelling national interest, inadequate state or administrative remedy,
and that the plaintiff was in a class protected by the statute. The
Moungey court's reaction was foreseeable if the approval of the
remedy had been viewed as opening the door to plaintiffs seeking
statutory vicarious liability in federal courts. The federal forum had
9 49 U.S.C. 5 1301 (26) (1970).
"
0 CODE OF ALA. TIT. 4, § 20(25) (1940); CONN. GEN. STAT. REV. § 15-34(20)
(1972); DEL. CODE ANN. TIT. 2 § 501 (1974); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 15 , 55 22.11,
22.42a-42o (1963); IND. CODE § 8-21-3-1(h) (1971); IOWA CODE § 328.1(14)
(1946); Ky. REV. STAT. § 183.011(16) (1970); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. TIT. 6 S
3(24) (1964); MAss. LAWS ANN. ch. 90, 55 35(j), 49B-49R (1975); MICH.
COMP. LAWS § 259.22 (1967); MINN. STAT. 5 360.013(10) (1966); Miss. CODE
§ 61-1-3(j) (1972); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 1-102(10), as amended, (Supp.
1974); NEB. REV. STAT. § 3-101(11) (1970); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. S 422:3(23)
(1968); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 63-1(16) (Supp. 1974); N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 251
(McKinney 1968); VT. STAT. ANN. TIT. 5, § 2(20) (1972).
11 Courts have refused to imply vicarious liability from state or federal statu-
tory language in McCord v. Dixie Aviation Corp., 450 F.2d 1129 (10th
Cir. 1971); Rogers v. Ray Gardner Flying Service, Inc., 435 F.2d 1389 (5th
Cir. 1970); Rosdail v. Western Aviation, Inc., 297 F. Supp. 681 (D.C. Colo.
1969); Yelinek v. Worley, 284 F. Supp. 679 (E.D. Va. 1968); Moungey v.
Brandt, 250 F. Supp. 445 (W.D. Wis. 1966); Moody v. McDaniel, 190 F. Supp.
24 (N.D. Miss. 1960); Nachsin v. De La Bretonne, Inc., 17 Cal. App. 3d 637,
95 Cal. Rptr. 227 (1971); Ferrari v. Byerly Aviation, Inc., 131 Ill. App. 2d 747,
268 N.E.2d 558 (1971); Guillen v. Williams, 27 Misc. 2d 575, 212 N.Y.S.2d 556
(1961). Courts have implied vicarious liability from similar or identical language
in Hays v. Morgan, 221 F.2d 481 (5th Cir. 1955); Sosa v. Young Flying Service,
277 F. Supp. 554 (S.D. Tex. 1967); Lamasters v. Snodgrass, 248 Iowa 1377, 85
N.W.2d 622 (1957); Hoebee v. Howe, 98 N.H. 168, 97 A.2d 223 (1953).
12 250 F. Supp. 445, 451 (W.D. Wis. 1966).
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been available to vicarious liability claims in previous years ' be-
cause of the willingness of some courts to imply a civil remedy."'
Some state courts encouraged imputing negligence to the aircraft
owner because of the owner's ability to ". . . spread the risk through
insurance and carry the cost thereof as part of [the] costs of doing
business."1 Statutory vicarious liability on the state level may have
the effect of easing the blind rush into federal court, especially when
finding vicarious liability based on the Act has proven so uncer-
tain.
At least some state courts have been willing to impute the pi-
lot's negligence to the aircraft owner on the basis of state statutory
language similar to that contained in the Federal Aviation Act of
1958." The most notable example of state implication of liability is
a New Hampshire case, Hoebee v. Howe." In Hoebee, the relevant
statute was identical to the Federal Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938,8
the predecessor to the present Act. Justice Blandin considered leg-
islative history and fashioned his opinion along those lines:
It seems to us from reading our act that the intent of our Legislature
is clearly to place responsibility on the owner, even though he be
without control, for the conduct of one to whom he entrusts the
plane.1"
In a similar interpretation of an Iowa statute, the Iowa Supreme
Court in Lamasters v. Snodgrass" held the aircraft owner vicarious-
ly liable under code language virtually identical to that of the Act
1 See, e.g., Fitzgerald v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 229 F.2d 499 (2d
Cir. 1956); Moody v. McDaniel, 190 F. Supp. 24 (N.D. Miss. 1960).
14 See note 11 supra.
15 Johnston v. Long, 300 Cal. 2d 54, -, 181 P.2d 645, 651 (1947) (Traynor,
J.).
18 Lamasters v. Snodgrass, 248 Iowa 1377, 85 N.W.2d 622 (1957); Hoebee v.
Howe, 98 N.H. 168, 97 A.2d 223 (1953).
1798 N.H. 168, 97 A.2d 223 (1953).
18 The Federal Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938 provided:
Any person who causes or authorizes the operation of aircraft,
whether with or without the right of legal control (in the capacity
of owner, lessee, or otherwise) of the aircraft, shall be deemed to
be engaged in the operation of aircraft within the meaning of this
chapter.
Federal Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, ch. 601, § 1, 52 Stat. 973 (now Federal
Aviation Act of 1958, § 101).
19 98 N.H. 168, -, 97 A.2d 223, 225 (1953).
" 248 Iowa 1377, 85 N.W.2d 622 (1957).
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of 1958.1 Although state courts have also interpreted their respec-
tive statutes as implying no vicarious liability," the strong precedent
of Hoebee lends weight to any subsequent state imposition of statu-
torily imputed negligence. Indeed, federal court denial of statutory
vicarious liability would not serve to discredit state approbation of
similar language, and a federal court decision imposing liability
under the Act could be taken as tacit approval of state courts' simi-
lar treatment of their own statutes.
The application of statutory vicarious liability might have fore-
closed the result adopted in Allegheny had the intent of the various
legislatures been consistently interpreted.' But, like others before it,
the Allegheny court did not base its decision on statutory grounds
alone. The court relied heavily on common law, reflecting a distrust
of statutory resolution. This return to the common law has revital-
ized agency theories, including joint enterprise and its basic defi-
nition.'
Joint enterprise is but one of the common law approaches to vi-
carious liability, the existence of which is premised in large part
upon the existence of a unique relationship between the parties in-
volved giving rise to a mutual duty. Because the underlying basis
for imputing liability to one party for the negligence of another lies
in this mutual duty, the relationship is analogous to partnership.'
The fiction thus evolved from the pseudo-agency interaction of the
participants has been most singular in its application.
The most common employment of joint enterprise is in auto-
mobile settings, but it has been limited even within that context.
Relatively few courts have attempted to impute the negligence of
the driver to his passenger."1 Although the doctrine seems particu-
21 Id. at -, 85 N.W.2d at 626.
22 Ferrari v. Byerly Aviation, Inc., 131 Ill. App. 2d 747, 268 N.E.2d 558
(1971); Guillen v. Williams, 27 Misc. 2d 575, 212 N.Y.S.2d 556 (1961).
23Aviation cases dealing with statutory vicarious liability have often based
their decisions in large part on legislative intent. See, e.g., Yelinik v. Worley, 284
F. Supp. 679, 681 (E.D. Va. 1968); Hoebee v. Howe, 98 N.H. 168, -, 97 A.2d
223, 225 (1953).
24 Compare Allegheny Airlines, Inc. v. United States, 504 F.2d 104 (7th Cir.
1974), cert. denied, 43 U.S.L.W. 3614 (May 19, 1975) (using the majority defini-
tion of joint enterprise) with Shoemaker v. Whistler, 513 S.W.2d 10 (Tex. 1974)
(using the Restatement definition of joint enterprise).
See note 2 supra.
20 Manley v. Horton, 414 S.W.2d 254 (Mo. 1967); Straffus v. Barclay, 147
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larly suited for that purpose, more often, the negligent driver has
raised joint enterprise as a bar to recovery by the passenger." The
restricted application of joint enterprise in this largest area of its
use is sharply contrasted by the claim of the plaintiffs in Allegheny
that the financially secure but absent "passenger" could be reached
through the negligent pilot. The dormant possibilities of joint enter-
prise as a vehicle for recovery against the aircraft owner began to
stir to life under the understanding tutelage of an imaginative plain-
tiff's attorney. Nor did the court consign that attempt to its historical
resting place, but looked upon the invocation of such an unusual, if
obvious, adhibition with apparent favor.
The definition of joint enterprise used by the Allegheny court is
that adopted by a majority of jurisdictions."' Its basic elements are
a community of interest in the object and purpose of the undertak-
ing, an equal right to direct and govern the conduct of the opera-
tion, and a contract, either expressed or implied. '
Tex. 600, 219 S.W.2d 65 (1949); Jones v. Kasper, 109 Ind. App. 465, 33 N.E.2d
816 (1941); Ahlstedt v. Smith, 130 Neb. 372, 264 N.W. 889 (1936); Fox v.
Lavender, 89 Utah 115, 56 P.2d 1049 (1936).
27 The use of joint enterprise as a bar to recovery is reflected in PROSSER:
In by far the greater number of cases, the question has been one
of contributory negligence, and the driver's misconduct has been
imputed to the passenger to bar his own recovery. 'Joint enterprise'
is thus of importance chiefly as a defendant's doctrine, imputing
the negligence of another to the plaintiff; and as such, it has not
been slow to draw the wrath of the plaintiff's partisans.
PROSSER at 476.
21 PROSSER at 477. This definition of joint enterprise is commonly applied,
although it differs in one material term from that proposed by the American
Law Institute. The Restatement definition requires, additionally, a community
of pecuniary interest in the common purpose.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 491, comment c (1965):
The elements which are essential to a joint enterprise are commonly
stated to be four: (1) an agreement express or implied, among
the members of the group; (2) a common purpose to be carried
out by the group; (3) a community of pecuniary interest in that
purpose, among the members; and (4) an equal right to a voice in
the direction of the enterprise, which gives an equal right of control.
"The court obtained these elements from Jones v. Hernandez, 148 Ind. App.
17, 263 N.E.2d 759 (1970). The court's use of this particular case for its defini-
tion of joint enterprise is somewhat incongruous in its factual setting. Jones
dealt with joint enterprise in a non-vehicular context, deriving its definition of
joint enterprise from Keck v. Pozorski, 135 Ind. App. 192, 191 N.E.2d 325
(1963), an automobile case. This mixed factual application of a common defini-
tion suggests that the Allegheny court could not or would not discern any appre-
ciable difference in the elements of joint enterprise, whether used in an auto-
motive, non-automotive, or aviation case.
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The Allegheny court found the first requisite element of joint en-
terprise by considering that the student and the flying school were
engaged in a project with a "community of interest" in obtaining a
pilot's license for Carey." The court held that, while Carey's interest
in obtaining such a license was obvious, the school also had a vested
interest in the venture in that it hoped to realize additional business
from Carey as a pilot and other potential pilots who might be drawn
to the school for training." The flying school and student would,
under the court's approach, always have this community of interest
because both are economically and objectively concerned with ob-
taining a goal that is important to each of them, notwithstanding the
fact that the goal is pursued for different reasons. The majority of
American courts, in traditional non-aviation cases, have, however,
not allowed the common use of a vehicle to meet the community of
interest requirement." Nor has joint enterprise liability been applied
when the parties involved had independent goals.' Apparently, the
Allegheny court disregarded these prior cases in favor of a new con-
cept of community of interest.
30 504 F.2d at 114.
3' 504 F.2d at 114. In finding a community of interest, the court said,
As to the "community of interest in the object or purpose" require-
ment, both Carey and Forth were seeking the common objective
of obtaining a private pilot's license for Carey. Carey's interest was
obvious, his personal convenience and to satisfy his desire to learn
to fly. Forth's interest in Carey's success was reflected in the addi-
tional business to be derived from Carey as a pilot and other po-
tential pilots who might be drawn to Brookside for training. Id.
32 Pope v. Halpern, 193 Cal. 168, 223 P. 470 (1924); Bryant v. Pacific Elec.
R. Co., 174 Cal. 737, 164 P. 385 (1917); Coleman v. Bent, 100 Conn. 527,
124 A. 224 (1924). Prosser describes the trend away from such broad definition:
One group of cases, now definitely very much in the minority and
almost passing out of the picture, have found a joint enterprise
in the mere association of the driver and the passenger in the use
of the vehicle for any purpose in which they have a common in-
terest of any kind.
PROSSER at 477.
3 Kepler v. Chicago, St. P., M. & 0. R. Co., 111 Neb. 273, 196 N.W. 161
(1923) (passenger driven as accommodation to mail letters); Hilton v. Blose,
297 Pa. 458, 147 A. 100 (1929) (on way to bowl on different teams in different
games); Conner v. Southland Corp., 240 So. 2d 822 (Fla. App. 1970) (going
to work for same employer on different jobs); Kuser v. Barengo, 70 Nev. 66,
254 P.2d 447 (1953) (delegates to convention).
34 In its opinion, the court cited no authority for its position in finding a
community of interest in the purpose. Apparently, the court assumed that the
logic of its position was so compelling as to invite no discussion, but when con-
sidered in the context of automobile joint enterprise cases, the consequences of
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Community of interest in the purpose of the venture can be
found in a flying school/student relationship only through a con-
siderable broadening of the bounds of previous definition.' The
court's opinion recognized a dichotomy of interest in the purpose
seen by Forth Corporation and that seen by Carey," but described a
most tenuous connection, the desire of the school and the student
to license Carey, as sufficient to form the necessary "community" of
interest." Such a conclusion seems a reversion to the factual fictions
disdained by courts in the previous vicarious liability situations."
Virtually any fact setting involving two persons doing business
could adapt to meet the requirements for "community of interest"
if the Allegheny court's emasculation of that requirement finds
wide acceptance."
Automobile joint enterprise precedent was inapplicable in de-
ciding whether the parties in Allegheny met the second joint enter-
prise requirement, an equal right to direct and govern the conduct
of the operation. In the joint enterprise cases involving automobiles,
both parties to the enterprise were present at the time of the tortious
act."0 The Allegheny court, however, unequivocally renounced a
requirement of joint presence at the time of the wrongdoing because
of the hazardous nature of the undertaking and Carey's status as a
such an obvious broadening of the definition of joint enterprise seem momentous
and certainly worthy of further explanation.
" The "community of interest in the object or purpose" of flying lessons is
likely to be nonexistent. The flying school, realistically, is interested in the pe-
cuniary aspects of its business, whether with regard to the tuition paid by the
student or the desire for future business. The student is interested in learning to
fly and receiving the required license, for whatever his personal reasons. It is a
broad generalization to state that any common incidental interest fulfills the
requirement for this element of joint enterprise. If joint enterprise is to remain
a viable means of imputing negligence, it must retain a more narrow focus than
the Allegheny court allowed, or be used to turn the most casual relationships into
situations of potential liability.
" See note 31 supra.
37 504 F.2d at 114.
38 PROSSER at 459.
To date there appears no case so broad in its acceptance of "community of
interest" standards as Allegheny. Because the court held a prima facie case of
joint enterprise had been established when it could have held defendant liable
without joint enterprise application, the possibility exists that this case is to be
interpreted as applying only to aviation cases in a narrow factual setting.
"0 PROSSER at 478-80.
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student pilot." The court reasoned that mutual control did exist:
Carey had control over the goal of obtaining his license, and was in
physical control of the aircraft at the time of the collision. Forth
Corporation had control over Carey as his instructor and had an af-
firmative obligation under federal air regulations to supervise and
control all facets of Carey's training.' In most automobile joint en-
terprise cases, the passenger need not have a right to take physical
control, but must have a right to direct the manner in which the ve-
hicle is driven. ' The Allegheny court concluded that the parties
did have an equal voice in controlling the aircraft's flight, even with-
out the physical presence of the instructor/owner, and that such mu-
tual control extended to the common objective of obtaining Carey's
private pilot's license."
41405 F.2d at 114. The court said,
Moreover, in view of the hazardous nature of Carey's undertaking
and his status as a student pilot, we reject any notion which urges
that equal control can be established only by a showing of joint
presence of the parties at the time of the alleged wrongdoing. Id.
The precise meaning of the court's statement is unclear. No authority for this
conclusion was cited by the court and the position is apparently unique in aviation
cases. The court's reference to the hazardous nature of the undertaking raises
questions concerning the possible application of "ultrahazardous" vicarious liability
reasoning by the court. Although a holding that flying is ultrahazardous would
be anachronistic, it would be more in consonance with precedent than inferring
that the element of mutual control may be assumed under hazardous conditions.
Indeed, applied to an automobile setting, this theory would allow the mutual
control requirement to be met when a solitary driver assumed control of the
automobile under dangerous road conditions or while that driver is inexperienced.
Such a connotation produces difficult questions concerning how much experience
is necessary and what conditions are safe enough to overcome the presumption
of mutual control. For a discussion of "ultrahazardous" precedents see note 8
supra.
4' The court said,
Carey had control over the goal of obtaining his private pilot's
license in that he alone had the power to determine his rate of
progress by the frequency and timing of his flying. Forth had con-
trol over Carey which emanated from the instructor-student rela-
tionship. In addition, Forth was under an affirmative obligation
under the federal air regulations to supervise and control all facets
of Carey's training.
504 F.2d at 114.
'Pope v. Halpern, 193 Cal. 168, 223 P. 470 (1924); Churchill v. Briggs,
225 Iowa 1187, 282 N.W. 280 (1938); Carroll v. Hutchinson, 172 Va. 43, 200
S.E. 644 (1939). Prosser summarizes such a relationship by saying, "It is not
the fact that he does or does not give directions which is important in itself,
but rather the understanding between the parties that he has the right to have
his wishes respected, to the same extent as the driver." PROSSER at 479-80.
44504 F.2d at 114. The requirement for mutual control was found by the
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The court easily found the final element of contract.' The very
basis of the relationship between a flying school, such as Forth Cor-
poration, and a student like Carey usually initiates with an express
written contract, and may contain additional implied contractual
terms.
The Allegheny court was not the first to deal with vicarious lia-
bility for the aircraft owner."" In Herrick v. Curtiss Flying Service,
Inc.,' it was held that without reference to servant and master or
principal and agent, liability could be imposed on the owner of the
airplane for a collision occurring while the plane was in the control
of a student pilot to whom it had been rented." Unlike the court in
Allegheny, the Herrick court did not discuss the possibility of joint
enterprise, but the court noted that something beyond the available
legal fictions was necessary to hold owners vicariously liable."
As demonstrated by ample statutory history, the desirability of re-
placing the usual common law approaches to vicarious liability has
been accepted for some time, even though the success of such leg-
islative measures has been very limited. "' Common law vagaries and
court, although the absence of any agent of Forth Corporation in the aircraft
makes the position difficult at best. Although the court does not mention such
a possibility, the finding of mutual control may rest in part on the distinct facts
of this case. The absolute necessity of allowing a student to fly solo; increased
control of the aircraft by ground personnel using radio; and the omnipresent
federal air regulations contribute to a sense that no pilot, and particularly no stu-
dent pilot, flies completely alone. Enhancing this view is the accepted position
that mutual right of control is the required element, not mutual physical con-
trol. If a doubt exists as to whether the parties have agreed to shared control,
the question becomes one for the jury.
41504 F.2d at 114.
41 Typically, flying schools and students enter into written contracts expressing
financial arrangements and liability of the parties. It should not be assumed
that every such contract would supply the requisite contractual relationship
necessary for joint enterprise. Although the element of contract has seldom been
discussed in detail, the contract should logically relate to the purpose of the en-
terprise. A contract only for financial arrangements between the school and stu-
dent does not go to the purpose of the venture or liability, and might be said
to have nothing to do with the joint enterprise. Use of implied contractual agree-
ments would usually supply the element in any event, but whether any contract
will suffice has not been directly decided.
" See note 11 supra.
"1 1932 U.S. Av. 110 (N.Y.).
49Id. at 125,
501d. at 122-25.
51 As early as 1939, the National Conference of Commisioners on Uniform
State Laws adopted a Uniform Aviation Liability Act which provided for strict
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inconsistent statutory usage indicate general dissatisfaction with the
legal results compelled by case precedent and code interpretation. A
court can hardly be faulted for attempting a universal application of
vicarious liability in the small area of general aviation. Of course,
any court assuming such a crusading role must expect a most rigor-
ous inspection of its work and must adequately prepare for the logic-
al challenge it will engender.
When taken in the context of vicarious liability precedent, the
attempt of the Allegheny court to apply joint enterprise becomes
difficult to fathom. The elements of joint enterprise are clearly
enumerated by cases and authors. The only break with tradition
in the definition of joint enterprise is that reflected in the American
Law Institute's Restatement of Torts.' The action of the court in
Allegheny is quite clearly moving against the trend by broadening
the already inclusive majority definition. Particularly in its finding of
a community of interest in the purpose of the venture, the court has
accepted a number of dubious presumptions." Surely any interest
on the part of the flying school in seeing its students licensed is in-
cidental to its primary financial interest.' A community of interest
shared by Forth Corporation and Carey would be incomplete with-
out joint interest in this important feature. Finding the element of
common interest in the way accepted by the court would allow vir-
tually any relationship to be characterized as a joint enterprise solely
on the ground of some incidental area of mutual benefit. An all-en-
compassing view of a legal fiction cannot be compatible with its ini-
tial purpose. For whatever policy considerations, joint enterprise
cannot be more acceptable than the previously rejected legal fic-
tions if it is predicated upon sweeping generalizations that draw in
factual contexts without discrimination.
liability in airplane crashes. The Act met with such opposition that it was never
offered for adoption.
51 For the Restatement definition of joint enterprise, see note 28 supra. The
addition of a community of pecuniary interest to the elements of joint enterprise
would narrow the definition and restrict its application. While not accepted by
a majority of jurisdictions, some recent cases in aviation have used the Restate-
ment definition, lending support to the trend away from joint enterprise. See, e.g.,
Shoemaker v. Whistler, 513 S.W.2d 10 (Tex. 1974).
"See note 35 supra.
" Substantial evidence was offered at trial and reiterated in Plaintiff's appellate
brief to the effect that the financial interest of Forth Corporation was its over-
riding concern. Brief for Appellants at 93-94, Allegheny Airlines, Inc. v. United
States, 504 F.2d 104 (7th Cir. 1974).
CASE NOTES
The court's view of mutual control stands in a stronger position.
Right of control is a possible exception to actual presence in the
student/instructor setting. Even without the physical presence of
an instructor, the pilot is arguably within an enveloping shroud of
regulations, flight plans, instructions, and radio control which make
him susceptible to control from the school. Accepting the "right to
control" language as sufficient to meet the elemental test, physical
presence could be seen as an incidental feature useful in proof of
joint enterprise.
The court's finding of the third element of contract is premised
upon solid grounds.' Indeed, if the other elements of joint enter-
prise are present, it seems unlikely that a court will deny submission
of the issue to the jury regardless of whether an express contract
exists. In a flying school/student situation, implied contracts abound
and should more than adequately fulfill the requirement even when
no express contract for services exists.
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals decided Allegheny on the
grounds of joint enterprise and statutory vicarious liability. In using
a statute whose language tracks that of the Federal Aviation Act of
1958,' the court added the weight of its opinion to those who would
claim vicarious liability under one of the eighteen state statutes now
in effect." With statutory precedent for such a decision clear, 8 the
court went beyond the necessary findings and held that a prima
facie case of joint enterprise had been shown. The directive tone of
the opinion assuages any doubts that the common law decision is
mere dicta. The court was manifestly willing to proceed on the joint
enterprise theory alone. But the statutory language is not so ambigu-
ous as to require a buttress; only two of the eighteen states with
such statutes have expressly denied that they provide a civil reme-
5 See note 46 supra.
56The Indiana Code § 8-21-3-1(h) (1971) states:
Operation of aircraft or operate aircraft-the use of aircraft for
the purpose of air navigation or piloting of aircraft. Any person who
causes or authorizes the operation of aircraft, whether with or with-
out the right of legal control (in the capacity of owner, lessee,
or otherwise) of the aircraft, shall be deemed to be engaged in the
operation of aircraft within the meaning of the statutes of this state.
5 TSee note 10 supra.
8 See note 11 supra.
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dy." One must assume that the court deliberately went beyond
statutory liability in an effort to promote common law remedies. In-
stead of strengthening and encouraging further use of the legal fic-
tions, and especially joint enterprise, the lack of authority and pau-
city of expressed reasoning by this court defeated the venture before
it had a fair chance to compete. The opportunity for a persuasive
case of joint enterprise in aviation was seriously undermined.
Public policy does seem to demand a workable legal solution to
the problem faced by survivors with no viable financial expectations.
Joint enterprise, like the other legal fictions, is well adapted to re-
solving these difficulties. The whole concept of legal fictions is based
in large part on the humanistic requirements and needs of difficult
legal circumstances. The answer is not redress through bad law, but
strengthening of statutory application. The dynamism needed is best
furnished through legislative enactments that can accurately reflect
the desires of the public. The solution is not to make the common
law unrecognizable, but rather to make use of statutory potential in
effecting a sound humanitarian result. The strength of the common
law lies in its maleability, not in unrealistic distortion.
Gerald S. Reamey
TORTS-MANUFACTURER'S NEGLIGENCE-The Buyer of a Used
Airplane Can Recover in Negligence from the Airplane's Manu-
facturer for Cost of Repair, Decline in Value and Loss of Use of
the Aircraft, Absent Any Accident. Omni Flying Club, Inc. v. Cess-
na Aircraft Co., -Mass.-, 315 N.E. 2d 885 (1974).
The Omni Flying Club purchased a Cessna demonstrator aircraft
with 150 flight hours' from an independent dealer. At the time of
the sale, Omni desired the remainder of the aircraft's warranty, and
the dealer undertook to obtain that warranty for Omni.' The lan-
59Ferrari v. Byerly Aviation, Inc., 131 Ill. App. 2d 747, 268 N.E.2d 558
(1971); Guillen v. Williams, 27 Misc. 2d 575, 212 N.Y.S.2d 556 (1961).
1Omni Flying Club, Inc. v. Cessna Aircraft Co., - Mass. -, 315 N.E.2d
885 (1974).
'Id. The warranty appeared in regular print in unnumbered pages behind the
index of the aircraft owner's manual.
